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ABSTRACT
The goal of our thesis is to provide an understanding of three
real estate financing alternatives being used today for the leveraged
acquisition of income-producing property. The selected alternatives
would be used more frequently with an increase in interest rates. By
looking at a hypothetical deal, in a high interest rate environment,
we will present an analysis of these financing alternatives from the
perspective of the lender, developer, and investor.
A secondary goal of this thesis is to highlight an excellent
investment opportunity for the developer and his investors. The
opportunity involves the acquisition of mismanaged, under-utilized,
income-producing properties that can be purchased at a reasonable
price and have value-added through better management, a rehabilitation
program and creative financing. We feel that success for real estate
investors can be achieved by the identification of investment
opportunities in which property value can be enhanced through
increasing emphasis on "value creation" using asset management and
financial structuring.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we will provide a brief description of the goal of
our thesis, a description of the hypothetical real estate deal we will
analyze, an explanation of the economic scenario we have assumed for
the discussion, and a preview of the structure of this thesis.
THESIS GOAL
The goal of our thesis is to provide an understanding of three
real estate financing alternatives being used today for the leveraged
acquisition of income-producing property. The selected alternatives
would be used more frequently with an increase in interest rates. By
looking at a hypothetical deal, in a high interest rate environment,
we will present an analysis of these financing alternatives from the
perspective of the lender, developer, and investor.
A secondary goal of this thesis is to highlight an excellent
investment opportunity for the developer and his investors. The
opportunity involves the acquisition of mismanaged, under-utilized,
income-producing properties that can be purchased at a reasonable
price and have value-added through better management, a rehabilitation
program and creative financing. We feel that success for real estate
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investors can be achieved by the identification of investment
opportunities in which property value can be enhanced through
increasing emphasis on "value creation" using asset management and
financial structuring.
HYPOTHETICAL DEAL
We propose the acquisition of a 165,904-square-foot community
shopping center which is thirteen years old. We plan a rehabilitation
program that will allow us to add value to the center and re-write
leases to market rent levels in the future. The center has been
mismanaged and underutilized and therefore offers great potential as
an investment. The focus of the thesis is to select the optimal
financing alternative for this venture. All analyses of this deal
have been done on a pre-tax basis and assume that all tax benefits are
allocated to the developer.
ECONOMIC SCENARIO
We propose a "high risk" economic scenario to be present at the
time of acquisition. Interest rates are high and the developer must
use creative financing to make the deal work. Our scenario is not a
"worst case" scenario; however, our goal is to present some lessons
that were learned by real estate participants during the 1980-1982
high interest rate period, as well as expose the reader to some of the
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investment banking techniques that are being used today in the real
estate industry.
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
We will first present a brief overview of the 1980-82 period and
focus on the relevant legislative banking issues that changed real
estate finance. Next, we will present our "high risk" economic
scenario. Then we will present an explanation of how the structure of
real estate deals has changed since the early 1980s. Chapter 5 will
present the details of our hypothetical deal. Chapter 6 will present
an overview of the financial strategy of the developer. Chapters 7-10
will present the three financing alternatives to be analyzed.
Finally, we will conclude our thesis with a discussion of the
financing alternatives and closing remarks.
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CHAPTER 2
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF LENDER'S INVOLVEMENT IN REAL
ESTATE DEALS DURING THE EARLY 1980s
In this chapter we will examine the changes that occurred in the
banking industry during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the effect
these events had on the activity of real estate lenders. We will also
review the effect deregulation had on these lenders, focusing on how
this precipitated their involvement in real estate ventures. At the
conclusion of this chapter we will review the changes which have taken
place since the early 1980s in real estate loan underwriting criteria.
BANKING IN THE EARLY 1980s
The early 1980s saw the emergence of large scale lender equity
participation in real estate ventures. Banking deregulation provided
the institutions the ability to compete with the money market for
investor capital. These institutions had to provide high nominal
rates of interest if they were to remain competitive. One avenue the
lenders turned to, both for high returns as well as a hedge against
inflation, was real estate.
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DEREGULATION ENHANCES LENDER'S COMPETITIVENESS
The legislation which brought competitiveness back to the lenders
was the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980. The Act was passed through Congress as interest rates on
three-month U.S. Treasury bills reached a previously unheard of high
of 11.506%!/ in that year. It provided the following:
The Act supercedes the authority of the individual
federal and state regulatory bodies in many respects. It
permits thrift institutions to expand their asset powers
by writing consumer loans, issuing credit cards, holding
corporate debt, and becoming more involved with service
corporations. All depository institutions may now offer
interest-bearing transaction accounts (often called NOW
accounts) 2/
This Act increased deposits not only to savings and loans but to
all depository institutions. These institutions were now allowed to
compete with money market funds, the same money market accounts which
had produced a major migration of passbook deposits from the thrifts
with the rising interest rates of the late 1970s. While the Act
permitted these institutions to compete in the marketplace, it also
significantly raised their cost of funds.
BANKS BECOME MORE ACTIVE REAL ESTATE PARTICIPANTS
The Act precipitated the massive emergence of lender participation
into many types of real estate ventures. Until the mid-1970s, real
estate investment capital was supplied in the form of long-term fixed
rate mortgages. The developer or investor typically supplied up to
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25% of the purchase price or cost of construction in a commercial
project. It was not uncommon through this period for the lender to
provide all the capital required as long as the project satisfied its
underwriting requirements. These long-term fixed rate loans proved
detrimental to the institution's profit and loss statements with the
sustained period of high inflation through the late 1970s.
The lenders were not the only group negatively impacted by these
economic conditions. The real estate developer found himself with
many economically non-viable projects due to the high debt service
dictated by the high interest rates. The prime rate averaged 12.67%
in 1979 and hovered at 15.70% in July of 1982, with a peak of 21.50%
in January of 1981.- The financial institutions' high cost of
capital necessitated these high rates to maintain profitability and to
prevent the migration of deposited funds back to the money markets.
Partnerships were formed between lenders and developers to
mitigate the effects of high interest rates. With the use of joint
ventures and participating mortgages, the lender was able to increase
his yields, while the developer was able to decrease his risk of
default and foreclosure. These deals required the lender to assume
much more risk than he was used to, while the developer sacrificed a
portion of his upside potential. The net result was a greater return
on the debt portion and a smaller return on the equity portion of a
given venture. Anthony Downs, in The Revolution in Real Estate
Finance, described the situation as follows:
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Capital suppliers are now capturing a higher share of the
total yield from each property, and developers or other
traditional transaction initiators a lower share.
Moreover, a greater percentage of the total capital
supplied now takes the form of equity, or some typ" of
'quasi equity,' and a smaller share is pure debt.-
The availability of funds on deposit in these institutions
necessitated their placement into loans and ventures which would
guarantee high yields. Real estate ventures provided the main avenue
for the placement of those funds. Many loan underwriting criteria
were relaxed. Highly speculative ventures were entered into on a non-
pre-leased or non-pre-sold basis. The funds available for these
ventures in conjunction with the enhanced real estate tax shelter
benefits generated by the Tax Recovery Act of 1981 brought about the
undesirable side effect of driving up real estate prices. The
pressure to place capital in potentially high yielding loans, in
combination with escalating real estate prices, brought about the
investment of funds into less than prudent speculative ventures.
Another significant event during this period was the government's
indirect support of this highly speculative lending activity by banks
and S&Ls. The Federal government, through the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation, indirectly supported many of the risks taken by these
institutions. Those institutions which participated in the riskier
ventures had that risk underwritten by the F.D.I.C. and the F.S.L.I.C.
Downs captures the essence of this risk taking by the lenders and its
underwriting by the Federal Government:
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Partial deregulation has created a serious imbalance
between the potential rewards and costs of certain kinds
of risk taking behavior by financial institutions,
especially those oriented towards real estate. Federal
deposit insurance removes most of the threat to banks and
thrifts of losing deposits if they grow rapidly or make
risky investments. But financial deregulation has
increased the potential rewards for such behavior. The
result has been much greater net incentives for banks and
thrifts to make highly risky investments, and many have
done so.
These institutions can now offer as high interests rates
as they wish; they can therefore grow rapidly by bidding
above market levels to attract deposits. With massively
increased total funds, they can leverage their initial
equity capital tremendously. It is true that regulatory
agencies recently have begun pressuring banks and thrifts
to increase their capital. But those institutions can
earn much larger fees in relation to that capital by
financing many more transactions. Moreover, they can
gamble on risky investments that promise high returns if
successful. For example, in 1983 some large thrift
institutions used highly transient short-term deposits to
make many long-term fixed rate mortgages. They were
hoping that interest rates would fall and they would
receive windfall gains plus large profits from greater
spreads. But interest rates rose in 1984, causing7some
of these institutions to come close to bankruptcy.,/
Many of the real estate ventures undertaken were failures.
Numerous lenders did not have the in-house expertise to underwrite
speculative real estate endeavors. In areas where overbuilding
occurred, sales did not materialize as projected, leases on commercial
or retail properties were not written at pro forma levels, or major
tenant concessions had to be made. The net effect was to produce many
projects which were negatively leveraged or generating a negative cash
flow.
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BENEFIT OF EXPERIENCE
Through a series of interviews with institutions active in joint
ventures, participating mortgages, and straight debt lending, we
confirmed that the most successful deals during the early 1980s were
those that had been underwritten conservatively. Market analyses,
demographics, valuation of leases, engineering and environmental
surveys, as well as developers' experience, were all necessary
ingredients when underwriting a deal. It appeared to us that both
lenders' and developers' attitudes towards risk, uncertainty, and
inflationary expectations have taken on a more sophisticated and hard-
line perspective because of their experience during the early 1980s.
A major lesson learned from this period was the need for the
developer and lender to pool their resources and develop parallel
incentives to meet both their objectives. During this high interest
rate environment, it became necessary for the developer to give up
some of the upside potential to the lender, and it further required
the lender structuring his loan to offer a below-market interest rate
and/or requiring a lesser amount of cash into the deal by the
developer. The attitudes of today's top real estate people seem to
reflect the lessons learned through that period.
In the next chapter we will define the high risk economic
scenario to be assumed for our analysis.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Economic Report of the President, January 1987, Washington, DC:
United States Government Printing Office, 1987, pp. 324-325.
2. A.S. Caron, The Plight of Thrift Institutions, Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institution, 1982, p. 10.
3. Economic Report of the President, op. cit., p. 324.
4. A. Downs, The Revolution in Real Estate Finance, Washington, DC:
The Brookings Institution, 1985, p. 9.
5. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
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CHAPTER 3
HIGH-RISK ECONOMIC SCENARIO
In this chapter we will define the high-risk economic scenario
which will be assumed to exist at the time of our acquisition. We are
not attempting to predict the future; however, we are making an
educated guess as to one possible economic scenario which may exist in
a few years.
DEFINITION OF "HIGH-RISK" ECONOMIC SCENARIO
Today, the U.S. is faced with a delicate economic balancing task.
We have become the largest debtor nation in the world and are faced
with a situation where we need to attract foreign capital with
attractive investment opportunities (i.e., high interest rates) as
well as keep interest rates below the record levels of 1982--levels
which could push America into a deep recession. For the purposes of
our analysis, we have defined a high-risk scenario as a prime rate of
11% and an inflation rate of 5%.
A March 1988 National Real Estate Investor article referred to a
scenario that is very similiar to the one we are proposing.
Consider this scenario: Last October's crash has a
sobering effect on the economy. The country slips into a
recession. At the same time, the government's failure to
significantly reduce the deficit, the lingering trade
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imbalance, and a weaker dollar combine to prevent
interest rates from declining further. In fact, a rise
in rates may become inevitable as part of an effort to
keep foreigners enthusiastic buyers of US debt. At the
same time, if the Federal Reserve Board tightens credit,
interest rates would move up, squeezing developer's cash
flow.1/
We have made these assumptions in an attempt to define a scenario
that would not stop all real estate investment activity, but would
require the developer to utilize the more innovative financing
alternatives available in today's marketplace. These assumptions of a
prime rate of 11% and inflation rate of 5% will be held constant for
the remainder of our thesis.
In the next chapter, we will describe how the demand for retail
real estate has changed since 1982.
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POOTNOTES
1. Sadoff, Amy and Lisa Cashin, "Hedging tools provide developers
with flexiblity in preparing for a worse-case economic scenario,"
National Real Estate Investor, March, 1988, p. 80.
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Chapter 4
CHANGES IN COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE INVESTING
SINCE EARLY 1980s
In this chapter we will examine how the demand for income-
producing property has changed since the early 1980s. We will
specifically examine how the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has shifted demand
to more economically sound projects. Second, we will consider the
factors and conditions which have brought about the recent increase in
demand for retail properties. Finally, we will explore those
circumstances which are creating new interest and demand for community
and neighborhood shopping centers.
REAL ESTATE AS A TAX SHELTER
For many years real estate has been used as a tax shelter vehicle.
Use of limited partnerships was prolific as high-income investors
looked for the tax shelter these entities could offer. Limited
partnerships and syndications were easily formed and capitalized.
Generally, the common objective was sheltering income. The possibility
of generating some long-term capital gain on the disposition of the
property was of secondary interest. The greater the property losses
the larger the tax write-off generated for the participants.
Interest in limited partnerships and syndications greatly
increased with the Tax Recovery Act of 1981. Downs, in 1985,
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described the reasons for this increased interest in the following way:
In the case of real estate syndication, the benefit is
shelter from federal income taxes. Investors who buy
syndication shares receive this benefit at no cost to the
syndicators. Hence they get higher returns per dollar of
cost to the syndicators than in other investments. Tax-
law changes in 1981, plus dramatic developments in stock
and bond markets in 1982, greatly increased the allure of
syndication shares for investors in 1983 and 1984.1/
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced much of the tax-driven
incentives for investing in real estate. Accelerated depreciation was
eliminated. The depreciation period on commercial properties was
increased to 31.5 years. No longer can the passive losses generated
by properties be used to offset regular income. While tax benefits of
ownership do still exist, they have been radically diminished. What
has evolved now in the marketplace are deals driven more by economics
(i.e., positive returns rather than by tax write-offs).
The three propositions for investing in income-producing real
estate versus stocks, bonds, or other alternative investments are
aptly described by Arnold, in Real Estate Investments After the Tax
Reform Act of 1986:
1. The economic benefits of well-located real estate
(i.e., annual cash flows plus gradual appreciation in
market value) compare favorably with alternative
investments.
2. Real estate investments offer the most favorable tax
benefits (i.e., the deferral of income taxes to the
future or the conversion of ordinary income into
long-term capital gain).
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3. Real estate can be financed with borrowed capital to
a much greater extent than can alternative
investments, and this financial leverage acts to
magnify the economic and tax benefits to the real
estate investor.2/
While these propositions are still valid, with the changes brought
about by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the cash flows generated by the
tax shield portion of the investment have been greatly diminished.
There can be no question that the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA '86) severely limits (but by no means eliminates)
the tax benefits of real estate. Other types of
investments, most notably common stocks and non-real
estate partnerships, also have lost tax benefits, but
real estate certainly has been hurt the most.
Consequently, the case for real estate investing now
rests much more heavily on economic benefits and
financial leverage. Real estate offerings generating
'deep shelter,' (i.e., large tax losses that formerly
could be used against other income of the investor), have
largely disappeared from the scene. However, seasoned
and well-maintained income properties in good locations
are likely to hold more appeal than ever before in view
of their ability to generate secure cash flow that, to
some degree, is sheltered by depreciation deductions.
Such a real estate investment has qualities akin to that
of a high-quality corporate bond, with the additional
attractions that (1) tax on a portion of the return is
deferred until the property is sold, and (2) moderate
appreciation in market value is likely._/
The bottom line regarding the effects of the Tax Reform Act of
1986 are that the well located, seasoned, and properly managed
properties are, and will continue to be, good sound economic
investments. Prudent real estate investments should provide a solid
hedge against inflation, generate tax shields, allow for deferral of
gains on a portion of the returns, as well as provide solid current
returns on capital invested. Income-producing properties will be
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valued for the returns they can provide rather than artificially
inflated values due to the tax losses which could be generated prior
to the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE INCREASED DEMAND FOR RETAIL PROPERTIES
The increasing availability of pension fund dollars in combination
with foreign investment into properties in the United States has
increased the demand for commercial and retail real estate. It is
estimated that the domestic funds available for investment in real
estate will double between 1986 and 1989 to some $105 billion.-
Offshore investment in U.S. real properties is expected to exceed $320
billion by 1990.-/ Many of the gains made in the stock market prior
to the "Crash" on October 19, 1987, also found their way into real
estate properties.
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE DECREASED SUPPLY OF
REGIONAL MALLS AND REGIONAL SHOPPING CENTERS
Regional shopping malls have been one of the principal targets of
the institutional investor. They provide a stable cash flow and their
tenants are mainly credit-rated national chains. These properties
further offer the potential for moderate to significant capital
growth. As demand for these properties increased, capitalization
rates have been driven to the 5-7% range, and once a group acquired
these properties they are reluctant to sell.
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Zoning and environmental constraints have decreased the
feasibility of new construction, further driving up prices of existing
malls. Also contributing to fewer new malls is the low growth in
retail sales in many parts of the country. Because the demand for
malls, and retail space in general, is a function of retailer's sales,
it is easy to see that without the growth in sales new construction is
not warranted.
INCREASE IN DEMAND FOR COMMUNITY AND NEIGHBORHOOD CENTERS
As the available funds cannot be placed into acquisition of
regional malls, the next retail alternatives for these investors are
the community and neighborhood shopping centers. Equitable Real
Estate's Emerging Trends in Real Estate 1987 pointed out this
situation but also warned about the possibility of overbuilding for
this market:
Shopping centers are the preferred investment target for
many institutional investors, so competitive bidding on
relatively scarce regional centers has kept prices high
through 1986. They will stay up in '87. However, most
of the retail purchase activity is now directed toward
neighborhood and community centers with credit tenants.
As a result these properties are also maintaining value.
By 1987, though, overbuilding of strip and small cente s
will depress prices for much of this kind of product 6/
The article goes on to say that in areas where there is good economic
growth, opportunities for sound investment do exist. "The Northeast,
which is benefiting from population, household, and income growth, as
well as very good residential sales, will offer the best overall
opportunities in '87/
opportunities in '87."- The 1987 prognosis in this article did
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come true, as evidenced by the continued strong demand for these types
of centers in the Northeast.
OPPORTUNITY FOR VALUE CREATION WITH UNDERVALUED CENTERS
As the demand for the seasoned, stable, income-producing community
and neighborhood centers increases, one can expect escalating
acquisition prices. Capitalization rates in some instances have been
driven to the 5%-7% level by institutions and private investors
anxious to place their funds. For the developer with the ability to
add value to existing properties, the opportunity does not lie with
the seasoned properties acquired at low capitalization rates.
Mismanaged properties, which are subsequently generating less than
market rate rents, may present the best opportunity for capital growth.
These under-utilized centers present opportunities for the savvy
developer to transform them into stable, high revenue producers.
These properties should be purchased at capitalization rates in the
10.5% to 11.0% range. Value can be added by capital improvements and
proper asset and property management. As leases are rewritten, base
rents will approach or equal market rates. With enhanced center
appeal, tenant's sales revenue will increase and rental overages as a
percentage of sales will also experience incremental growth. Finally,
upon disposition lower capitalization rates will reflect the added
value to these centers.
-25-
In the next chapter we present the reader with our hypothetical
deal which involves the acquisition and rehabilitation of a
mismanaged, under-utilized community shopping center.
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FOOTNOTES
1. A. Downs, The Revolution in Real Estate Finance, Washington DC:
The Brookings Institution, 1985, p. 11.
2. A.L. Arnold, Real Estate Investments After the Tax Reform Act of
1986, Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc., 1987, p. 7.
3. Ibid., p. 11.
4. Business Week, "Meet Real Estate's New Czars: The Middlemen,"
October 5, 1987, p. 98.
5. B.W. Mahoney, "New RELPs For Old: Strategies for a Changing Real
Estate Marketplace," The Real Estate Finance Journal, Spring 1988,
p. 12.
6. Real Estate Research Corporation, "Markets in Perspective,"
Emerging Trends in Real Estate: 1987, Chicago, 1986, p. 29.
7. Ibid.
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CHAPTER 5
DESCRIPTION OF HYPOTHETICAL COMMUNITY CENTER ACQUISITION
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a description of the
hypothetical community shopping center we have targeted for
acquisition. We will discuss our rationale for determining the
acquisition price. We will further provide a description of
rehabilitation work to be done and discuss how this rehabilitation in
conjunction with improved property management will add value to the
center. We will further outline the assumptions used regarding:
demographics, competition, lease terms and conditions as well as
operating revenues and expenses. We will conclude this chapter with
an explanation of our unleveraged spread sheet model, and how we
addressed tax considerations.
DESCRIPTION OF CENTER
We have targeted for acquisition a community shopping center
located in the northeastern United States. We assume that this center
is in a suburban area as opposed to an urban location. The center
contains 165,904 square feet with gross leasable area of 155,950
square feet. It is configured as a typical "strip center."
-28-
The center is thirteen years old at the time of acquisition.
Ongoing property management up until this point has been less than
ideal. Furthermore, continuing capital improvements have been less
than adequate, and this is reflected in the poor street appearance of
the center. This lack of proper management has inhibited growth of the
net operating income and hence its value.
DETERMINATION OF THE PURCHASE PRICE
One of the main topics of discussion with the various lenders we
interviewed was ascertaining an appropriate capitalization rate for
determining the acquisition price. While there were many variations in
rationale for determining a cap rate in our proposed high risk economy
the conclusions were similar. There would be upward pressure on
capitalization rates in a high interest rate environment.
Many deals are presently financed with short money, and as the
term on these loans expire in this type environment, we will see
further upward pressure applied to the cap rates. The assumption is
that a particular project which is viable at one rate may not be when
refinanced at the higher interest rate. Some projects may actually
generate a negative cash flow at 150-300 basis points above the
previous financing rate. It then becomes quite costly for the
developer or owner to hold the property in his portfolio. These
economic conditions will bring about an abundance of available
projects. This oversupply will then drive cap rates up. This was
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evidenced during the early 1980s when the prime lending rate was in
the 15%-19% range. A Boston real estate investment advisor who was
active during this period had the following observations:
What happened in 1981 and 1982 when everything hit the
fan, was that you'd have many deals cross your desk every
day. Cap rates which were really trading at a very
narrow band of 9-10% for a long period of time, all of a
sudden ran up to 11-12% cash on cash yields. There was
so much property and so little money that people were
very anxious to move them. And when rates did come down,
all of a sudden the deals dried up.! /
The second major issue in choosing an appropriate cap rate for
determination of the acquisition price was the present physical
condition and net operating income of the center. Once acquired we
address both these negative issues with capital improvements and
better center management, although, it does little for first and
second year's net operating income (NOI) and cash on cash return to
the equity investor.
A developer may be willing to receive no current return on
investment in lieu of future higher yields, but he cannot assume the
same for his equity investors. It was therefore important to choose a
cap rate which would allow for some minimum current cash on cash
return to our equity investors.
The acquisition cap rate we chose was 10.56%. The purchase price
arrived at with this cap rate satisfied the returns required by the
lender and the equity investors as well as providing an attractive net
present value (NPV) for the developer. This cap rate is also deemed
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appropriate given the specifics of the project as well as the economic
conditions under which the acquisition is taking place.
A terminal cap rate of 9.5% was applied to year 6's NOI for the 5
year holding period and year 11's NOI for the 10 year holding period.
This terminal cap rate was used to calculate the sales price of the
center at the end of our holding period. We felt this to be a
conservative cap rate given the value being added to the center as
well as the uncertainty with interest rates in the year of disposition.
In all of our alternative financing scenarios we calculated the effect
on both NPV and internal rate of return (IRR) for terminal cap rates
of 9.0% and 10.0% as well as the 9.5%. In our calculations on NPV, we
used a discount rate of 13% on the lender's cash flows and an 18%
discount rate on the developer's and investor's cash flows. Exhibit 1
displays the project assumptions.
PROPOSED CENTER REHABILITATION
We have assumed a $3.00 per square foot budget for capital
improvements to the center. This $3.00 per square foot equates to a
total price of $497,712. Given that the center is 13 years old at the
time of acquisition, major structural and mechanical improvements do
not need to be done at this point. The monies will be spent on
resurfacing the parking lot, upgrading landscaping, signs, and
lighting as well as improving the appearance of the building's
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Exhibit 1
PROJECT ASSUMPTIONS:
Center Size (gross sf) 165,904.00
Percentage center leasable 94.00%
Gross Leasable area 155,949.76
Vacancy rate (w/ smaller tenants) 10.00%
Aquisition price per sf $58
Acquisition Price $9,622,432
Capital Improvements per sf $3
Capital Improvements in $ $497,712
Total Purchase Price & Improvements $10,120,144
% recovered
Common area Maintenance ($ per sf) $0.75 100.00%
Real Estate Taxes ($ per sf) $0.75 100.00%
Insurance ($ per sf) $0.24 100.00%
Administration (15% of CAM) 15.00% 100.00%
Property Mgmt (5% of Gross Rent) 5.00% 0.00%
Reserve for Replacement (2.5% gross rent) 2.50% 0.00%
Renewal Lease Commission 1.50%
New Lease Commission(see schedule)
Percentage renewal subject to commission 40.00%
Expense Growth Rate (annual) 4.00%
Developer's Discount rate 18.00%
Lender's Discount Rate 13.00%
Terminal Capitalization rate 9.50%
Sales expense 4.00%
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facade. These improvements will take place in and be completed during
the first year of ownership.
Furthermore, 2.5% of the gross rental revenues have been allocated
to ongoing capital improvements. This figure is higher than is
typically budgeted on projects of similar age. We have chosen this
figure to reflect the possible necessity of doing some tenant
improvements as an inducement to renewal of expiring leases or to
entice new tenants into the center as spaces become vacant. This
figure is not adequate to do a complete tenant space preparation. It
is merely to offer, should it become necessary, some cost saving to
tenants.
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
Property management is a critical feature in our overall plan to
add value to this shopping center. We assume day-to-day property
management is contracted out to a third party, professional management
company. This management company's fee will be tied to the center's
performance, as opposed to a straight fee that is fixed regardless of
the center's profitability. This type of performance fee structure
will encourage efficient managerial performance.
The developer in our scenario also has strong economic incentives
to maintain a high degree of control both over the project as well as
the property manager. His returns are closely tied to the project's
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overall increase in value. This will only be accomplished by adding
value both through capital improvements as well as excellent property
and asset management.
DESCRIPTION OF ASSUMPTIONS MADE
As this is a hypothetical shopping center created for pedagogic
purposes, we made certain assumptions regarding location, demographics,
competition, etc. As stated above this center is located in the
northeastern United States. It is located in a suburban area which
has, until recently (due to the economic conditions described in
Chapter 3) experienced moderate positive growth in residential
development, disposable family income, and retail sales.
We further assumed that due to restrictions on zoning, as well as
prohibitive environmental issues, there is no new retail space planned
within the immediate geographic area. Moreover, due to the economic
scenario we have proposed, small growth in retail sales has diminished
demand for additional new retail space.
DESCRIPTION OF TENANTS AND THEIR LEASE TERMS
The center is anchored by a discount clothing store, a supermarket,
and a drugstore. All three are credit rated. Additional credit-rated
tenants occupy 20,000 square feet. The balance of the space, 30,000
square feet, is occupied by non-credit rated local tenants. A vacancy
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reserve of 10% has been calculated in our analysis for both the
credit-rated smaller tenants and the non-credit rated local tenants.
Due to the center's previous mismanagement, rents per square foot are
below market prices.
BREAKDOWN BY TENANT
Included in Exhibit 2-6 are the lease terms and projections for
growth in future rental income.
Discount Clothing Store
- 15 year lease with 4, 5 year options to renew.
- total lease term with options is 35 years
- percentage overage on sales revenues is 2.85%
- breakpoint on sales revenue is $122.81/sf
- annual base rent at year of acquisition is $3.50/sf
- overage on sales at year of acquisition is $1.87/sf
- effective rent at year of acquisition is $5.37/sf
- new base rent at lease renewal, year 16, $4.90/sf
- overage on sales in year of lease renewal $2.42/sf
- effective Rent at lease renewal $7.32/sf
- new base rent at second renewal, year 21, $6.13/sf
- overage on sales in year of lease renewal $4.06/sf
- effective rent at second renewal $10.19/sf
Supermarket
- 20 year lease with 4, 5 year options to renew.
- total lease term with options is 40 years
- percentage overage on sales revenues is 1.5%
- break point on sales revenues is $233.33/sf
- annual base rent at year of acquisition is $3.50/sf
- overage on sales at year of acquisition is $2.72/sf
- effective rent at year of acquisition is $6.22/sf
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- new base rent at lease renewal, year 21, $4.73/sf
- overage on sales in year of lease renewal $5.25/sf
- effective rent at lease renewal $9.98/sf
Drug Store
- 15 year lease with 4, 5 year options to renew.
- total lease terms with options is 35 years
- percentage overage on sales revenues is 2.85%
- break point on sales revenues is $157.89/sf
- annual base rent at year of acquisition is $4.50/sf
- overage on sales at year of acquisition is $2.49/sf
- effective rent at year of acquisition is $6.99/sf
- new base rent at lease renewal, year 16, $6.30/sf
- overage on sales in year of lease renewal $3.20/sf
- effective base rent at lease renewal $9.50/sf
- base rent at second renewal, year 21, $8.19/sf
- overage on sales in year of lease renewal $5.33/sf
- effective Rent at second renewal $13.52/sf
Credit Rated Smaller Tenants
- 5 year leases with 3, 4 year options to renew
- total lease term with options to renew is 17 years
- 16% Rent increase every 4 years
- annual rent at year of acquisition $10.93/sf
- new rent when leases rewritten, year 18, $15.30/sf
- rent on renewal of new lease, year 20, $18.36/sf
Non-Credit Rated Local Tenants
- 3 year lease with 4, 3 year options to renew
- total lease term with options to renew is 15 years
- 5% rent increase every year through end of lease term
- annual rent at year of acquisition $13.67/sf
- new rent when leases rewritten, year 16, $18.66/sf
- 5% rent increase every year for balance of lease term
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Exhibit 2
Lease Terms and Rental Revenues
DISCOUNT CLOTHING STORE
15 YEAR LEASE W/ 4, 5 YEAR OPTIONS = 35 YEARS
Annual Base Rent $3.50
Renewal Base Rent $4.90
Second Renewal Base Rent $6.13
Percentage overage 2.85%
Breakpoint $122.81
Growth rate 5.00%
Square Feet (SF) 50,000.00
YEAR SALES/SF OVERAGE/SF TOTAL REVENUE REV/SF % INCREASE
1 100.00 0.00 175,000.00 3.50 0.00%
2 105.00 0.00 175,000.00 3.50 0.00%
3 110.25 0.00 175,000.00 3.50 0.00%
4 115.76 0.00 175,000.00 3.50 0.00%
5 121.55 0.00 175,000.00 3.50 0.00%
6 127.63 0.14 181,870.12 3.64 3.93%
7 134.01 0.32 190,963.63 3.82 5.00%
8 140.71 0.51 200,511.81 4.01 5.00%
9 147.75 0.71 210,537.40 4.21 5.00%
10 155.13 0.92 221,064.27 4.42 5.00%
11 162.89 1.14 232,117.48 4.64 5.00%
12 171.03 1.37 243,723.36 4.87 5.00%
13 179.59 1.62 255,909.53 5.12 5.00%
ACQUISITION YEAR
14 188.56 1.87 268,705.00 5.37 5.00%
15 197.99 2.14 282,140.25 5.64 5.00%
16 207.89 2.42 366,247.27 7.32 29.81%
17 218.29 2.72 381,059.63 7.62 4.04%
18 229.20 3.03 396,612.61 7.93 4.08%
19 240.66 3.36 412,943.24 8.26 4.12%
20 252.70 3.70 430,090.40 8.60 4.15%
21 265.33 4.06 509,344.92 10.19 18.43%
22 278.60 4.44 528,249.67 10.56 3.71%
23 292.53 4.84 548,099.65 10.96 3.76%
24 307.15 5.25 568,942.14 11.38 3.80%
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Exhibit 3
Lease Terms and Rental Revenues
SUPERMARKET
20 YEAR LEASE W/ 4, 5 YEAR OPTIONS = 40 YEARS
Annual Base Rent
Renewal Base Rent
Percentage overage
Breakpoint
Growth rate
Square Feet (SF)
YEAR
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
ACQUISITION YEAR
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
$3.50
$4.73
1.50%
$233.33
5.00%
40,000.00
SALES/SF OVERAGE/SF
220.00
231.00
242.55
254.68
267.41
280.78
294.82
309.56
325.04
341.29
358.36
376.27
395.09
414.84
435.58
457.36
480.23
504.24
529.46
555.93
583.73
612.91
643.56
675.74
0.00
0.00
0.14
0.32
0.51
0.71
0.92
1.14
1.38
1.62
1.88
2.14
2.43
2.72
3.03
3.36
3.70
4.06
4.44
4.84
5.26
5.69
6.15
6.64
TOTAL REVENUE
140,000.00
140,000.00
145,530.00
152,806.50
160,446.83
168,469.17
176,892.62
185,737.26
195,024.12
204,775.32
215,014.09
225,764.80
237,053.04
248,905.69
261,350.97
274,418.52
288,139.45
302,546.42
317,673.74
333,557.43
399,235.30
416,747.06
435,134.42
454,441.14
REV/SF
3.50
3.50
3.64
3.82
4.01
4.21
4.42
4.64
4.88
5.12
5.38
5.64
5.93
6.22
6.53
6.86
7.20
7.56
7.94
8.34
9.98
10.42
10.88
11.36
% INCREASE
0.00%
0.00%
3.95%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
19.69%
4.39%
4.41%
4.44%
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Exhibit 4
Lease Terms and Rental Revenues
DRUG STORE
15 YEAR LEASE W/ 4, 5 YEAR OPTIONS = 35 YEARS
Annual Base Rent
Renewal Base Rent
Second Renewal Base Rent
Percentage overage
Breakpoint
Growth rate
Square Feet (SF)
$4.50
$6.30$8.19
2.85%
$157.89
5.00%
10,950.00
YEAR
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
11
12
13
ACQUISITION YEAR
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
SALES/SF OVERAGE/SF
130.00
136.50
143.33
150.49
158.02
165.92
174.21
182.92
192.07
201.67
211.76
222.34
233.46
245.13
257.39
270.26
283.77
297.96
312.86
328.50
344.93
362.18
380.28
399.30
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.23
0.47
0.71
0.97
1.25
1.54
1.84
2.15
2.49
2.84
3.20
3.59
3.99
4.42
4.86
5.33
5.82
6.34
6.88
TOTAL REVENUE
49,275.00
49,275.00
49,275.00
49,275.00
49,312.78
51,778.42
54,367.35
57,085.71
59,940.00
62,937.00
66,083.85
69,388.04
72,857.44
76,500.31
80,325.33
104,051.60
108,268.68
112,696.61
117,345.94
122,227.74
148,049.12
153,431.31
159,082.60
165,016.45
REV/SF
4.50
4.50
4.50
4.50
4.50
4.73
4.97
5.21
5.47
5.75
6.04
6.34
6.65
6.99
7.34
9.50
9.89
10.29
10.72
11.16
13.52
14.01
14.53
15.07
% INCREASE
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.08%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
29.54%
4.05%
4.09%
4.13%
4.16%
21.13%
3.64%
3.68%
3.73%
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Exhibit 5
Lease Terms and Rental Revenues
CREDIT RATED SMALLER TENANTS
5 YEAR LEASE W/ 3, 4 YEAR OPTIONS = 17 YEARS
16% RENT INCREASE EVERY FOUR YEARS
YEAR 18: LEASES ADJUST TO MARKET RENTS
Annual Base Rent $7.00
Rent increase 16.00%
Renewal Increase At Year 16 40.00%
Square Feet (SF) 20,000.00
YEAR TOTAL REVENUE RENT/SF %INCREASE
1 140,000.00 7.00 0.00%
2 140,000.00 7.00 0.00%
3 140,000.00 7.00 0.00%
4 140,000.00 7.00 0.00%
5 140,000.00 7.00 0.00%
6 162,400.00 8.12 16.00%
7 162,400.00 8.12 0.00%
8 162,400.00 8.12 0.00%
9 162,400.00 8.12 0.00%
10 188,384.00 9.42 16.00%
11 188,384.00 9.42 0.00%
12 188,384.00 9.42 0.00%
13 188,384.00 9.42 0.00%
ACQUISITION YEAR
14 218,525.44 10.93 16.00%
15 218,525.44 10.93 0.00%
16 218,525.44 10.93 0.00%
17 218,525.44 10.93 0.00%
18 305,935.62 15.30 40.00%
19 305,935.62 15.30 0.00%
20 305,935.62 15.30 0.00%
21 305,935.62 15.30 0.00%
22 305,935.62 15.30 0.00%
23 367,122.74 18.36 20.00%
24 367,122.74 18.36 0.00%
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Exhibit 6
Lease Terms and Rental Revenues
NON-CREDIT RATED SMALLER TENANTS
3 YEAR LEASE W/ 4, 3 YEAR OPTIONS = 15 YEARS
Annual Base Rent
Annual Rent increase
Renewal Increase At Year 16
Square Feet (SF)
$7.25
5.00%
30.00%
30,000.00
YEAR
9
10
11
12
13
ACQUISITION YEAR
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
RENT REVENUE
217,500.00
228,375.00
239,793.75
251,783.44
264,372.61
277,591.24
291,470.80
306,044.34
321,346.56
337,413.89
354,284.58
371,998.81
390,598.75
410,128.69
430,635.12
559,825.66
587,816.94
617,207.79
648,068.18
680,471.59
714,495.17
750,219.93
787,730.92
827,117.47
RENT/SF
7.25
7.61
7.99
8.39
8.81
9.25
9.72
10.20
10.71
11.25
11.81
12.40
13.02
13.67
14.35
18.66
19.59
20.57
21.60
22.68
23.82
25.01
26.26
27.57
% INCREASE
0.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
30.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
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OPERATING REVENUES AND EXPENSES
Revenue
Revenues consist of base rents as well as the overages generated
by tenants' sales volume above a predetermined natural breakpoint,
where the natural breakpoint is defined as the initial base rent per
square foot divided by the percentage overage. Overages are applicable
to the three anchor tenants only. Calculated into the rental revenues
is a vacancy reserve of 10% based on the credit-rated smaller tenants
as well as the non-credit-rated local tenants. These smaller tenants
are much more susceptible to a recessionary economy than the large
credit-rated tenants. Therefore, we have calculated the vacancy
reserve at 10%, but have limited the application of this reserve to
just the smaller tenants.
The sum of all the tenants rent less the vacancy reserve is
labeled as 'TOTAL RENT' in our unleveraged spreadsheet model. Exhibit
7 displays the unleveraged spread sheet.
Expenses Recoveries
The following expenses are 100% passed through to the tenants:
- common area maintenance at $.75/sf of leased area
- real estate taxes at $.75/sf of leased area
- insurance at $.24/sf of leased space
- administration fee: 15% of the common area maintenance charge.
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The sum of the recoverable expenses is labeled 'TOTAL RECOVERIES'
on our spreadsheet. Total rent plus total recoveries is labeled
'TOTAL INCOME'.
OPERATING EXPENSES
All expenses listed in "EXPENSE RECOVERIES" are listed under the
category of "OPERATING EXPENSES." Three operating expenses which are
not recoverable to the owner are Property Management, Leasing
Commissions and Reserve for Replacement.
The property management fee is 5% of the total rent and will be
paid to a third party management company. Leasing commissions are
calculated on the credit-rated smaller tenants as well as the
non-credit-rated local tenants. These two types of tenants together
occupy 50,000 square feet of the center. We assume that the
developer will handle 60% of these leases as they renew or are
rewritten. The other 40% we assume will be handled by a leasing
agent. The commissions on these leases are as follows: new leases
will pay the leasing agent 5% of the first years base rent, 4% on the
second and third year's base rent, 3% on the fourth year's base rent
and 2% on the fifth year's base rent. On leases which are simply
being renewed, and which have been secured by the leasing agent, a
1.5% commission will be paid for each year of the tenant's occupancy
under the renewed lease. It should be noted that these commissions
were not paid up front in our spreadsheet analysis. Rather, they are
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paid in the year in which the rent revenue is received by the
developer. Whether commissions were paid in full at time of executing
the lease or over the term of the lease was a very controversial topic
among many of the developers we interviewed. For the sake of
simplicity in our model we have assumed that the commissions are paid
when the revenues are received. Whether they are paid in full up
front or over the lease period does not have a significant effect on
the results of our analyses.
Reserve for replacement is 2.5% of the gross rent. These funds
are used for capital replacement on an ongoing basis. The 2.5% figure
is higher than traditionally allocated on centers of this size and
age. The reason for this higher reserve is explained in the section
"Proposed Center Improvements" above.
NET OPERATING INCOME
The net operating income (NOI) figure is the difference between
total income and total operating expenses. This figure indicates the
earning capacity of the shopping center, before any debt service and
cash flow from the tax shield. Exhibit 8 shows our projection of NOI
growth over the proposed 10-year holding period. It can be seen that
the rehabilitation, as well as improved asset and property management
enables NOI to grow more rapidly than it would if dependent on
inflation only. The gap between NOI and inflation can also be viewed
as the increase in value we are adding over time.
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Exhibit 8
Net Operating Income (NOI) Growth
$2,500,000
$2,000,000
$1,500,000
$1,000,000
$500,000
$0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
YEAR
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BEFORE DEBT CASH FLOW
These figures represent the cash flows out of the project as a
result of its operation. The ($10,120,144) is the amount invested
into the project for both acquisition and capital improvements.
A capitalization rate of 9.5% is applied to produce a gross sales
price of $22,125,654.42. A 4% sales expense is deducted from this
amount to produce a net sales price of $21,240,628.24. This net sales
price is added to year 10's NOI to generate a total cash flow in year
10 of $23,266,761.91. The original investment of $10,120,144 along
with year 1 through year 10's NOI plus the net sales proceeds added to
year 10's NOI are discounted back to generate an unleveraged IRR of
18.40%.
This same methodology was used to calculate residual proceeds in
all our financing alternative spread sheets.
TAX CONSIDERATIONS
For the purpose of this thesis all analyses are done on a pre-tax
basis. We have assumed all cash flows generated by tax shields are
allocated to the developer and his investors. We have further assumed
that two of the three lenders are tax-exempt institutions and cannot
utilize the tax benefits. In these cases, the tax-exempt institutions
price the return on their money accordingly. The third institution is
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a commercial bank which prices their money based on a spread over the
prime rate and again all tax benefits flow to the developer and his
investors.
-48-
FOOTNOTES
1. Interview with Joe O'Connor, President, Copley Real Estate
Advisors, February 19, 1988.
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CHAPTER 6
DEVELOPER'S FINANCIAL STRATEGY
In this chapter we will explore the financial strategy of the
developer. As stated earlier, we feel that an attractive opportunity
exists for the developer in the acquisition of a mismanaged
under-utilized property and with the creative financing of this
property. We will introduce three financing alternatives available to
the developer.
o A straight debt deal where he obtains a mortgage for 75% of
the acquisition price and capital improvements (referred to
as initial value) and must contribute his own cash or a
guarantee amounting to 25%;
o A participating mortgage with a pension fund advisor where he
obtains 85% financing with a below-market coupon rate and
provides the lender with 30% participation;
o A joint venture with a life insurance company where he
obtains 100% financing and does not contribute any cash.
Obviously there are many other options and variations of these options
but we have decided to focus our attention on these three popular
financing alternatives.
We will analyze these options from a risk/reward framework. The
more capital the developer has at risk, the greater the return he
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requires. The financial strategy question becomes a risk preference
question where the developer must choose between sharing the risk and
reward with an aggressive lender (i.e., pension fund advisor) or
maintaining all of the upside potential and accepting much greater
risk.
FINANCING ALTERNATIVES
We will analyze three financing alternatives for our hypothetical
deal . They are (1) a participating mortgage with a real estate
pension fund advisor, (2) a joint venture with a life insurance
company (managed by the life insurance company's subsidiary which
serves as a real estate investment advisor), and (3) a straight debt
deal with a commercial bank. In an attempt to keep all variables and
return measurements consistent, we have assumed that the developer
must raise the required equity for each financing alternative. His
cost of equity is the required return of the equity investor. In the
participating mortgage and straight debt deals, we have simulated the
arrangements that the developer would have with his equity investors.
Therefore the cash flows to the developer are after-debt service and
return to equity investors. In the joint venture the life insurance
company contributes 100% of the required cash. These three financing
alternatives will be discussed in detail in Chapters 7, 8, and 9. In
the remainder of this chapter we will qualitatively discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of each alternative and we will focus our
attention on the risk/reward tradeoff of each alternative.
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6.1 Participating Mortgage
In the high interest rate scenario we have posed, the developer
must reduce his debt service payments if his project is to be
successful. Our first financing alternative is a participating
mortgage with a pension fund advisor. Participating mortgages
historically have been more popular during periods of high interest
rates.
At such a time, a market-rate mortgage frequently calls
for debt service that exceeds the free and clear return
from the property. The result is either downside
leverage or, worse, a negative cash flow for the
borrower. So the borrower is willing to give up a share
of future increases in cash flow (and/or a share of
refinancing or sale proceeds) in order to get a
below-market rate initially that permits a satisfactory
cash flow.1 /
Participating mortgages and other "hybrid debt" instruments have
become increasingly popular as a means of funding acquisitions of
income-producing property.
Traditionally, institutional lenders have been the source
of participating mortgages. Recent trends, however,
particularly the 'deinstitutionalization' and
'securitization' of real estate finance, have created a
number of alternative lenders and have made possible new
financing arrangements that involve some form of lender
participation in the profits generated by the
property.Z /
Many real estate investment advisors prefer "hybrid debt"
investments to outright ownership as the hybrid debt investment is
considered less risky. The two most common hybrid debt structures are
the participating and convertible mortgages. They offer the lender a
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guaranteed minimum return and allow the lender to participate in the
upside potential of the property. As stated in the October 1987 Real
Estate Financing Update,
....institutional real estate investors have shown a
distinct preference over the last several years for
making mortgage loans that are 'participating' or 'equity
orientated.' Such loan structures allow the lender a
base or contract interest rate, plus the ability to
participate in increases in gross or net income and/or in
proceeds derived from future refinancing or sale and/or
the right to convert at a future date to a full or
partial ownership position.//
In our risk/reward analysis, we recognize that by receiving a
below-market interest rate and a higher loan-to-value ratio with a
participating mortgage, the developer must share some of the upside
potential with the lender. By receiving 85% financing (as opposed to
75% in the straight debt deal) the developer is reducing his capital
risk as well as conserving capital. Therefore he will be rewarded
with a lower return. This is accomplished by allowing the lender to
share in the annual cash flow after-debt service and in the residual
proceeds. The participating mortgage deal we will analyze represents
our intermediate financing alternative. The developer must raise 15%
of the initial value from equity investors. The results in Exhibit 9
show that the developer will achieve an NPV of $1,143,889. Exhibit 10
shows that the lender would receive a 14.54% IRR over the assumed 10
year holding period. (These results will be discussed in detail in
Chapter 8.)
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Exhibit 9
Developer's Net Present Value (NPV)
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Exhibit 10
Lender's Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
18.00%
14.54%
11.50%
Participating
Mortgage
Joint Venture Straight Debt
IRR
20.00% -
16.00%
12.00% •
8.00%
4.00%
0.00%
E
I
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6.2 Joint Venture
The minimum risk alternative for the developer is the joint
venture. In this case the developer achieves 100% financing and is
not required to contribute any cash. He contributes only his
development expertise. The joint venture is also a preferred
investment vehicle of the institutional investor. The joint venture
satisfies both parties' objectives: the developer achieves 100%
non-recourse financing, and the joint venture partner participates in
the upside potential of the project and benefits by the expertise of
the developer. As stated in the Spring 1988 WG&L Real Estate Outlook,
...several pension fund managers have found the high
returns of development to be attractive enough to
outweigh the risks. They try to mitigate the risk by
selecting one or two capable developers per market and
endowing them with an exclusive franchise for their
funds. This system can work exceedingly well because it
allows the developer to capitalize on critical site
acquisition and tenant courting opportunities instead of
the endless search for debtor equity. The institutional
investor benefits from being able to participate in
high-yielding development projects whose risks are
reduced by consistent, participative management.4/
The joint venture ranks on the low spectrum of our risk/reward
matrix. The developer reduces his downside risk by contributing zero
cash and therefore will have a reduced reward. Exhibits 9 and 10
(previous) show the Developer's NPV and Lender's IRR. The developer
would receive a NPV of $740,456. This deal provides the joint venture
partner with an IRR = 18.00%.
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6.3 Straight Debt
Our straight debt deal has the greatest risk for the developer as
he must raise equity or provide a guarantee amounting to 25% of the
initial value. He is exposed to a higher debt service payment than
the other two alternatives and therefore his capital risk is greater.
In return for assuming a higher risk, he maintains the entire upside
potential. In our analysis we assume that the developer finances 100%
of the purchase price with a commercial bank and he provides the bank
with a guarantee for 25% of the total debt amount. The developer must
raise this guarantee by involving investors who obtain a letter of
credit (LOC) for the 25% equity/guarantee amount. The LOC must come
from a third-party financial institution with a credit rating
acceptable to the underwriting commercial bank. In return for this
"credit" investment, the developer will share the cash flow available
for distribution in a 50/50 proportion with the LOC investor. Thus
the developer shares the upside potential with the LOC investor, not
the lender, resulting in a higher NPV for the developer.
Before concluding our discussion of the straight debt deal, we
would like to clarify the use of the LOC in this deal. The LOC serves
as the guarantee provided to the lender for 25% of total debt. LOC is
defined in the Encyclopedia of Real Estate as follows,
An agreement in writing by a bank or other lender (the
issuer), made at the request of a customer (account
party), that the lender will honor drafts or other
demands for payment by third parties (the beneficiaries),
in accordance with the conditions set forth in the
agreement. In essence, letters of credit are instruments
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by which a bank substitutes its own credit for that of an
individual or business firm. The obvious advantage of a
letter of credit is that the borrower need not use his
own assets; nor need he pay interest on borrowed funds.
His only cost is a relatively small fee paid to the
issuer. The account party should have a very high credit
rating or else provide acceptable collateral in order to
obtain the letter of credit.5/
In this deal, we have assumed that the LOC investor pays the
relatively small fee to the issuer. Our discussions with lenders
confirmed that the annual fee for a LOC would be approximately one
percentage point.
The lender does not participate in the upside potential of the
straight debt deal but rather is paid a debt service payment and
initial loan fee. In a high interest rate environment a straight debt
deal can by very profitable for the lender.
Although the lender has no upside potential, the
double-digit contract interest rate (and internal rate of
return) over a 10-year holding period is quite
competitive on an absolute basis with returns achievable
from outright ownership investments as well as from
participating mortgage loans. Additionally, risk
adjusted returns from straight debt investments can be
superior to those of participating debt or ownership
positions. 6/
Exhibit 11 displays the equity investment and NPV for the three
alternatives. In the participating mortgage, the developer pays a
below-market interest rate and distributes 30% of the upside potential
to the lender. In addition, he provides his equity investors with a
10% cumulative preferred return plus 50% of the remaining cash flow
and residual value. The developer maintains an effective upside
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Exhibit 11
Developer's NPV and Equity Investment
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participation of 35%. In the joint venture, the developer pays the
joint venture partner an 11% cumulative preferred return plus 75% of
remaining cash flow and residual value. The developer maintains an
effective upside participation of 25%. While the participating
mortgage only requires 15% equity, and the joint venture is 100%
financed by the joint venture partner, both of these deals require
giving away a significant portion of the upside potential. The
straight debt deal, with a LOC, allows the developer to maintain 50%
of the upside potential.
In the next three chapters we will analyze the three financing
alternatives in detail.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Mortgage and Real Estate Executives Report (MER), "Overview of
Participating Mortgages." Volume 19, No. 11, August 1, 1986, p. 3.
2. Kelley, Peter C.. "Advantages of Participating Mortgages," Real
Estate Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, Spring 1987, pp. 54-55.
3. Real Estate Financing Update, "Increasing Acceptance of Straight
Debt." Vol. 4, No. 2, October 1987, p. 1.
4. WG&L Real Estate Outlook, "1988: The Year of The Niche Dweller,"
Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 1988, p. 28.
5. Arnold, Alvin A. and Jack Kusnet, The Arnold Encyclopedia of Real
Estate. Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1978, p. 463.
6. Real Estate Financing Update, op. cit., p. 2.
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CHAPTER 7
PARTICIPATING MORTGAGE
In this chapter we will present the terms of the participating
mortgage. We will review the results of this financing alternative
from all three perspectives: lender, equity investor and developer.
TERMS OF THE DEAL
The funding and payoff positions of the deal are displayed
graphically in Exhibit 12. This capitalization chart displays the
positions of the lender, developer and equity investor on a priority
basis. The pension fund advisor provides 85% of the initial value in
a participating mortgage with a principal amount of $8,602,122. He is
in the most secure position which is often referred to as the "first
position." The developer must raise equity through equity investors
contributing the remaining $1,518,022. The two parties contribute the
initial value of $10,120,145 which is used to purchase the property
and to fund the capital improvements program discussed in Chapter 5.
The non-shaded area of the chart depicts the priority payment schedule
for available annual cash flows to be distributed after the payment of
debt service and preferred return to the equity investor. This
priority payment schedule is also used to distribute residual proceeds
after repayment of the outstanding mortgage balance and equity
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Exhibit 12
PARTICIPATING MORTGAGE CAPITALIZATION CHART
Increasec
Value
Initial Value
$10,120,145
Participation
Above 100%
100%
85%
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investors contributed capital. (The relationship between the
developer and equity investor will be discussed later in this chapter.)
The lender receives annual participation equal to 30% of available
cash flow after debt service. The lender also receives 30%
participation in net sales proceeds after repayment of the outstanding
mortgage balance. The developer and equity investor receive 70% of
annual cash flow after debt service and 70% of net sales proceeds
after repayment of outstanding mortgage balance. The equity investor
receives a cumulative preferred return of 10% on their invested
capital. After the preferred return the developer and equity investor
split remaining cash flows 50/50.
EXPLANATION OF PARTICIPATING MORTGAGE SPREADSHEET MODEL
Exhibit 13 displays the participating mortgage spreadsheet. The
participating mortgage has an accrual feature that can be useful
during periods of high interest rates. Exhibit 14 shows the accrual
table. In earlier years when NOI does not exceed debt service
("coupon rate") the developer can calculate debt service using the
"pay rate" and accrue the difference between the "coupon rate" and
"pay rate." In our scenario the accrual feature was not utilized as
NOI exceeded the coupon rate in year one. This accrual feature could
be quite attractive to the developer in our assumed high risk economy,
as it would help to reduce his cash and liquidity risk. The lender
receives annual debt service of $903,222 plus annual participation
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Exhibit 14
Participating Mortgage Accrual Table
PARTICIPATING MORTGAGE ASSUMPTIONS:
Coupon rate 10.50%
Pay rate 9.50%
Percentage financing 85.00%
Lender Financing 8,602,122.40
Investor's Equity 1,518,021.60
Annual Participation 30.00%
Residual Participation 30.00%
Investors Preferred Return 10.00%
Investors Participation 50.00%
Developer's Participation 50.00%
ACCRUAL TABLE
YEAR 1 2 3 4
Beg Balance 8,602,122.40 8,602,122.40 8,602,122.40 8,602,122.40
Interest due (coupon rate) 903,222.85 903,222.85 903,222.85 903,222.85
Interest received (pay rate) 817,201.63 817,201.63 817,201.63 817,201.63
Gross accrual 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Accrual contribution from CF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Net Accrual 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
End Balance 8,602,122.40 8,602,122.40 8,602,122.40 8,602,122.40
5 6 7 8 9 10
8,602,122.40 8,602,122.40 8,602,122.40 8,602,122.40 8,602,122.40 8,602,122.40
903,222.85 903,222.85 903,222.85 903,222.85 903,222.85 903,222.85
817,201.63 817,201.63 817,201.63 817,201.63 817,201.63 817,201.63
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8,602,122.40 8,602,122.40 8,602,122.40 8,602,122.40 8,602,122.40 8,602,122.40
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equaling 30% of cash flow after debt service. The equity investor
receives a preferred return equal to 10% of his invested capital or
$151,802. In the first two years, cash flow available for distribution
does not satisfy the equity investors preferred return. The shortfall
is accrued until year 3 where the accrual is paid off and the investor
receives an annualized return in this year of 16.45% (16.45% in year 3
is made up of 10% preferred return and a 50/50 participation in year 3
cash flow available for distribution.) The remaining cash flow after
preferred return to equity investor is split 50/50 between the equity
investor and the developer.
In the remainder of this chapter we will describe the deal
participants' position and a discussion of this financing alternative
from their perspective.
LENDER'S PERSPECTIVE
The participating mortgage we have described is a typical
structure of a pension fund manager. Pension fund managers are
fiduciaries and as such they must be prudent in underwriting deals as
well as aggressive in their attempt to maximize their client's return
on capital. An interview with a Boston-based pension fund manager
confirmed their responsibility as a fiduciary as well as their
commitment to developing parallel incentives with the developer.
We want to make a lot of money for our clients and we're
fiduciaries. So we have to exercise every opportunity
possible to not only recover the capital of our client,
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but to make money for them. So we're aggressive.
Typically, if things work out the way we expect them to,
everyone is happy. But if they don't, we want to make
the developer motivated to stay in the deal. And we
accomplish this by having his equity first at risk.11
In our hypothetical market the lender (pension fund manager) would
require a total IRR of 14.54%. This IRR is composed of three
components: 1) annual interest payment, 2) annual participation,
and 3) residual participation. In our deal, we provided the lender
with his required return of 14.5% composed of a coupon rate of 10.5%,
30% of annual cash flow participation, and 30% residual
participation. The NPV to the lender is 4815,768. As can seen from
Exhibit 13 (previous), we have run a sensitivity analysis on the
terminal capitalization rates ranging from 9.0% to 10.0%. The
intermediate level is 9.5% and this has been used as our most probable
figure.
The lender acts as a fiduciary and will confirm that the
developer's project assumptions and demographic information is
conservative. They typically fund a higher loan to value amount than
a commercial bank; however, they will ensure that the developer has
cash in the deal. Pension fund managers structuring this type of deal
will work hard to develop parallel incentives so that the developer
views the lender as his partner. An interview with a Boston-based
lender addressed the issue of the developer's guarantee. This quote
is typical of the lender's attitude toward the repayment of its loan.
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When we loan money, we loan it on real estate,
principally. And of course, as I indicated, in addition
to location we consider management, competition,
demographics, and timing. But we do require signatures
in most instances, it depends on the amount of equity in
the property. If you came in with a 60% loan to value
and you say you don't want to sign, chances are I
wouldn't have a problem with that. 75%, 80% I would have
a problem. I think if people want to borrow money, they
have to be prepared to pay it back. Why should they be
concerned about signing for i1 personally, if they are
going to pay it back anyway? _
In addition to personal guarantees, the lender will want to
approve all leases and major capital expenditures. They would also
want the right that if the property value decreases to a certain
level, as measured by net operating income, they could cause a
foreclosure, step in, and take over the property. They will also
protect themselves by restricting prepayment. Prepayment may be
possible with lender approval in which case there will be a
significant penalty to compensate for their reinvestment risk. A
Boston-based pension fund manager responded to the prepayment question
as follows:
We would have to right to call but I don't think we would
give you the right to pre-pay. Again, it just depends on
the deal and the value creation. If it looked like
returns were going to be increasing slowly, we probably
wouldn't allow you to pre-pay. If it looks like you're
going to provide us with dramatic returns early on and
then performance was going to flatten out again, we would
allow you to repay at that point because you're
increasing our IRR by pre-paying.3 /
When asked about the actual terms he responded with this
discussion.
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You might be locked out for 36 months and thereafter you
could pre-pay at a penalty of 5% a year, declining 1% a
year every year. So that if you prepaid, we would be a
little dissappointed we didn't have our money at work,
but we'd get 5% extra that year anyhow. So it's worth
it. But also we would get to recognize all that increase
in value quickly.4 /
He explained the reinvestment issue with an analogy to investing
in a bond.
We have reinvestment issues. In essence, part of the
investment is like buying a bond and you're locking in a
coupon rate of 10%. If rates go down, and you get
prepaid at par, then you've got to reinvest at a lower
return. That is the same as selling the bond at a
haircut. So in those kinds of situations allowing you to
prepay may work against us. But if it's a volatile
market and we think there's value creation, it might be
worth it for us to take the capital appreciation and let
the bond go, in which case we'd also be trading off a
lower coupon. If we were in at 9.5% and the market was
at 9%, we might not be doing that bad on the reinvestment
issue. But if we were in at 10.75%, with 35% of the deal
and the market was now at 9%, then we would be trading a
high yielding bond for a low yielding bond.2/
DEVELOPER'S PERSPECTIVE
The participating mortgage alternative is our intermediate case
for the developer in terms of the risk/reward tradeoff. Exhibit 15
displays the risk/reward analysis of the three alternatives. The
developer must raise equity of $1.5 million and his NPV totals
$1,143,889. The developer's IRR is irrelevant because of his zero
capital investment. There are several advantages of this structure
from his perspective. He locks in a below-market coupon rate which
allows him to achieve positive leverage and provide current return to
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Exhibit 15
Risk: Reward Analysis
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equity investors. The lender provides an accrual feature which could
be quite useful during the first few years of operation. He can use
the "pay rate" of 9.5% in the early years if the property does not
generate enough cash flow to meet the "coupon rate" payments. He
achieves 85% financing which provides him with added capital
preservation. These features reduce his capital risk and make the
participating mortgage very attractive to the developer.
EQUITY INVESTORS
This financing alternative is also attractive to the developer's
equity investors as it provides them a current return. This is a very
critical component as it will assist the developer in marketing this
deal and in raising equity. Exhibit 16 displays the growth in annual
return to the equity investors. As can be seen, first year return on
investment (ROI) is 7.65% and tenth year ROI is 30.89%. The investor
receives a preferred return of 10% and a 50/50 split with the
developer on annual cash flows and residual cash flows. This deal
provides the investor with a 23.48% IRR and a $593,945 NPV over the 10
year assumed holding period. This deal is not tax-driven but it can
be assumed that the developer would pass some tax benefits to the
investors.
In the next chapter, we will examine the joint venture alternative.
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Exhibit 16
Participating Mortgage
Investor's Annual Return on Investment (ROI)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
YEAR
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FOOTNOTES
1. Interview with Michael Ervolini, Vice President, Aldrich, Eastman
& Waltch. (2/26/88).
2. Interview with Oscar Wasserman, President, Mutual Realty Financial
Corporation. (2/16/88).
3. Ervolini, op.cit.
4. Ervolini, op. cit.
5. Ervolini, op. cit.
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CHAPTER 8
JOINT VENTURE
In this chapter we will present the terms of the joint venture
deal. We will review the results of this financing alternative from
the developer and joint venture partner's perspectives.
TERMS OF THE DEAL
The funding and payoff positions of this deal are displayed
graphically in Exhibit 17. This capitalization chart shows that the
life insurance company (joint venture partner) provides 100% financing
equal to the initial value of $10,120,145. The non-shaded area of the
chart depicts the priority payment schedule for distribution of annual
cash flows to be distributed after the payment of a preferred return
to the joint venture partner. This schedule is also used to
distribute residual proceeds after repayment of the joint venture
partner's contributed capital.
In this deal the relationship between the two parties is fairly
straightforward. The joint venture partner receives a cumulative
preferred return of 11%, which is accrued in the early years until the
property can support it, and then the joint venture partner and
developer split the remaining cash flows 75/25. At the sale of the
property, the joint venture partner's investment is repaid and then
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Exhibit 17
JOINT VENTURE CAPITALIZATION CHART
Increasec
Value
Initial Valui
$10,120,145
cipation
ve 100%
i%
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net sales proceeds are also split 75/25. An interview with the
President of a Boston real estate investment advisory firm which is a
subsidiary of a life insurance company revealed that they would look
at this deal from a profit-maximizing perspective and therefore hold
it for five years.
When we do this type of business, we consider it in-fill,
rehabilitation, rework, sell it to someone else, the main
amount of money you're going to make is by buying it as
an under-valued, under-managed asset, rehabing it,
putting on new paint, the paper on the walls, new
signage, and everything else and selling it to a new
investor. So we normally look at a deal like ýhis as
being a 3-to-5 year deal-to maximize return._/
EXPLANATION OF THE JOINT VENTURE SPREADSHEET MODEL
Exhibit 18 displays the joint venture cash flows over the five
year holding period. The joint venture partner receives an annual
cumulative preferred return of $1,113,216. As one can see, the
project's NOI does not satisfy the preferred return during the first
two years and the shortfall is accrued and compounded until year 3
when NOI is large enough to pay the joint venture partner his
preferred return plus the net accrual. The annual cash flow after
preferred return is distributed to the joint venture partner and
developer in the ratio of 75/25. The residual calculation is handled
by the same formula. The joint venture partner is repaid his original
investment and then the net sales proceeds are split 75/25.
In the remainder of this chapter we will describe the joint
venture partner and developer's perspectives on this deal.
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JOINT VENTURE PARTNER
Our interviews revealed that life insurance companies have become
more popular to developers as joint venture partners because of their
surplus of funds to invest, as well as their knowledge of the real
estate investment process. A quote from Business Week, October 5,
1987, by George Peacock, Chairman of Equitable Real Estate Investment
Management, clarifies the life insurance company perspective of joint
venturing with a developer. "While Prudential and Equitable have
tried their hands at solo development, their best success has been in
.2/
partnership with a good, local developer."-2/ Institutions are
willing to do joint ventures with experienced developers if the
project meets their investment criteria. In the high risk economic
scenario we have assumed, the deal would have to be very attractive.
An interview with a Boston real estate investment advisor helped us
quantify the criteria for making this project a joint venture
candidate.
When you get into that economic environment, a lot of
money dries up. It's got to be a heck of a good
property. If most of your return is generated by high
leverage, you're going to find out that makes for a
really tough deal. You're going to have to see an
unleveraged internal rate of return in the m d-teens
before you're going to find it financeable._3
In this deal, the joint venture partner receives an IRR of 18.0%.
His NPV is an attractive $2,031,712. In this deal the joint venture
partner is financing 100% of the initial value and requires a
preferred return and 75% of the cash flows. Since the joint venture
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partner's returns are tied to the performance of the property, he is
careful in selecting developers to work with. Although the joint
venture partner is providing all of the cash, the developer's
expertise and hands-on involvement are critical to the success of the
project. As with the participating mortgage deal, parallel incentives
are developed to maintain both parties' commitment to the project. An
interview with a past pension fund advisor and current real estate
investment banker described this point very accurately.
Because the developer is adding value over time, the
lender wants to get his share of the benefits. Chances
are, the lender or joint venture partner--especially if
its a passive pension fund--doesn't want to go in and do
those things that you're saying can be done to the
property. The lender needs a developer to stay in, to do
those things. The developer's return must be based on
his success in accomplishing a set of goals that he tells
the lender he can accomplish. From the lender's point of
view, they shouldn't have a deal where the developer
never gets to see any return, because developers tend to
get discouraged and go off to another project. So, it's
a question of building up parallel incentives so that
both lender and developer are going for the same
objectives.A/
As we stated earlier, this structure is the least risky
alternative for the developer. Therefore it poses the greatest risk
to the lender (joint venture partner). This justifies the high
percentage of cash flows that the joint venture partner requires in
this environment. The lender will minimize his risk by carefully
underwriting the deal as well as scrutinizing the developer's track
record and reputation. A joint venture such as this one requires a
close working relationship between the two parties. The joint venture
partner must take an active role in the management of the deal to
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ensure that objectives are achieved and the "parallel" incentives
remain in place. A quote by Paul Sack from the RREEF funds described
the fact that the joint venture partner cannot be a silent partner but
must be involved in all major decisions.
It's not enough that the joint venture developer has the
necessary expertise on his staff. The pension fund
manager who goes into development must ensure that he or
his manager also have enough high-quality gqople with
enough time committed to do the job right.-
DEVELOPER'S PERSPECTIVE
The joint venture is the least risky of the financing alternatives
in terms of capital at risk. Exhibit 15 (previous) shows the fact
that the developer does not contribute any cash and receives a NPV of
4740,455. The developer's IRR is irrelevant because of his zero
capital investment. The greatest advantage of the joint venture from
the developer's perspective is the fact that he achieves 100%
financing in a period of high interest rates. He has eliminated all
interest rate risk and has preserved his capital. When you look at
this deal you must also consider the value associated with the fact
that the developer did not have to raise any equity.
The greatest disadvantage of this alternative is the fact that he
must pay the joint venture partner an 11% cumulative preferred return
as well as 75% of all cash proceeds. By achieving 100% financing, the
developer can participate in more projects and limit his portfolio
risk through diversification of both property type and geographic
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location. As stated in a 1984 Institutional Investor article, "High
interest rates have forced developers to scramble for cash. Desperate
for funds to keep their crews working, many have been willing to give
up big pieces of equity in exchange for guaranteed sources of
6/
capital."- Thus, during periods of high interest rates, developers
may turn to the joint venture as an available source of financing.
In the next chapter, we will examine the straight debt deal.
-82-
FOOTNOTES
1, Interview with Joe O'Connor, President, Copley Real Estate
Advisors. (2/19/88).
2. Business Week, "Meet Real Estate's New Czars: The Middlemen,"
October 5, 1987, p. 101.
3. O'Connor, op cit.
4. Interview with Mark J. Waltch, Partner, Artel Associates.
(2/29/88).
5. Pension World, "Real estate development: How much risk can you
take?", January, 1985, p. 38.
6. Joe Kolman, "The boom in real estate development funds,"
Institutional Investor, November, 1984, p. 168.
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CHAPTER 9
STRAIGHT DEBT DEAL
In this chapter we will present the terms of the straight debt
deal. We will review the results of this financing alternative from
all three perspectives: lender, Letter of Credit (LOC) investor, and
the developer.
TERMS OF THE DEAL
The funding and payoff positions of this deal are displayed
graphically in Exhibit 19. This capitalization chart displays the
positions of the lender, LOC investor, and developer on a priority
basis. The commercial bank funds 100% of the initial value with a
floating rate 10-year mortgage. It is a rather complicated structure
that will be described in detail in the lender section of this
chapter. The lender is in the most secure or "first" position. The
developer provides the bank with a guarantee for 25% of the total debt
amount. He accomplishes this by involving investors who obtain a
Letter of Credit (LOC) for $2,664,267. The LOC comes from a third-
party financial institution with a credit rating acceptable to the
underwriting commercial bank.
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Exhibit 19
STRAIGHT DEBT CAPITALIZATION CHART
Increased
Value
Initial Value
$10,657,069
Participation
Above 100%
100%
Investors LOC
$2,664,267
75%
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The non-shaded area of the chart depicts the priority payment
schedule for annual cash flows to be distributed after the payment of
debt service. The developer and LOC investor split any available cash
flows 50/50. The same formula is used to distribute the net sales
proceeds after repayment of the outstanding mortgage balance.
EXPLANATION OF THE STRAIGHT DEBT SPREADSHEET MODEL
Exhibit 20 displays the straight debt cash flows. The commercial
bank funds a total of $10,657,069 which is composed of a total
purchase price and improvements figure of $10,271,946, and an interest
reserve account amounting to 4385,122. The interest reserve account
is used to fund the interest shortfall during the first two years.
Some commercial banks are more comfortable setting up a reserve
account that is drawn against to fund interest shortfalls. This is
used instead of an accrual feature during a construction period or a
period of high interest rates. An interview with a commercial lender
explains the rationale behind such an account.
I would create an interest reserve. You draw against
that interest reserve to pay the interest on a monthly
basis. Say, you have a $10 million commitment, all you
need to borrow day 1 is $8 million and there are no other
items in the loan budget. So you have a $2 million
interest reserve and the presumption is that by the time
that reserve is exhausted, the property will have
increased its net operating income to the point where it
can service $10M. That's a way of handling it, but
that's very different from the classic situation of the
pay and accrue and backending the interest.1I
In our straight debt deal we create an interest reserve account to
cover our interest shortfall during the first two years.
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From the third year on, project NOI covers the debt service
payments. The lender receives annual debt service payments of
$1,283,993 for the first five years. We assume that at the end of
year 5, interest rates have dropped and we can refinance and increase
our outstanding debt amount to $12,455,560 at 10.5%. As one can see,
the refinancing explanation shows that the property's year 6 NOI
capped at 9.5% provides a new property value of $16.6M. Maintaining a
75% loan/value ratio allows the developer to pull out $1.79M from the
deal. Our interview with a commercial lender emphasized the
importance of two factors in evaluating a developer's pro forma:
1) the developer's ability to refinance and pull cash out of the deal
as an indication of the property's successful operations, and 2) the
property's ability to service the debt with a reasonable coverage
ratio.
At the point the property is stabilized (could be 3 year
stabilization process), the NOI of the property must be
able to service the debt with a coverage margin, because
from a lender's standpoint, the primary way out is not
net cash flow of the property, it's a refinance. And if
you've put too much debt on the property, that gives you
no margin for error at the maturity of the loan to have
the developer be able to go out in a tough interest rate
scenario and refinance the property for more than or an
amount equal to your outstandings. What you really want
to see is that the project, in a reasonable amount of
time, achieves the debt service coverage on the amount
you're willing to lend. That's the biggest fear from a
lender's standpoint for going long, is that you've got to
be comfortable that under all kinds of scenarios that you
can refinance out.2/
As you see in our deal, we achieve a reasonable debt coverage ratio of
1.18 in year 5 and we refinance at the end of year 5. The other
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specifics of the debt structure will be discussed in the lender
section of this chapter.
The LOC investor participates in the cash flow available for
distribution. These cash flows are split in a 50/50 ratio between the
LOC investor and the developer. The residual distributions are
allocated in the same ratio. The lender is repaid the outstanding
mortgage balance and the net sales proceeds are split 50/50 between
the LOC investor and the developer.
In the remainder of this chapter we will describe the deal
participants' position and a discussion of this financing alternative
from their perspective.
LENDER'S PERSPECTIVE
The straight debt deal involves a commitment with the commercial
bank for a 10-year, floating rate note. We would use one of the newly
developed "hedging" tools to eliminate the interest rate risk
associated with this mortgage. Aside from the leasing and economic
risks, the interest rate risk associated with a floating rate mortgage
can be the greatest threat to the developer. Several "hedging" tools
have been developed to guard against interest rate volatility. The
interest rate swap market has evolved to the point where swaps can be
used by developers to lock in a fixed rate liability for the life of
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their loan. As stated in a March, 1988 National Real Estate Investor
article,
The best-known hedging tool, interest rate swaps, are a
method for converting floating rate debt into fixed.
They do this by permitting two parties to exchange
interest payments on a stipulated principal amount.
Citicorp, for example, frequently enters into swaps with
developers wherein Citicorp receives fixed interest
payments and pays out to the developer or his lender a
floating rate that matches the floating rate on his
debt. The principal is not exchanged. As a result, the
developer locks in a fixed rate, generally for up to 10
years, and is protected against any further rise in
rates.2/
Our interview with a commercial lender revealed the fact the their
loan committee would insist on our "locking in" a fixed rate
liability.
In fact I would insist on 'fixing' the interest rate
liability. For a 5 year deal the developer must lock in
his cost of funds day one to fix it for 5 years, because
the biggest risk in any transaction after you've gotten
over the market risk and the releasing risk--is the
interest rate fluctuation risk. A perfectly sound
project that works at 10% is a dog at 13% interest
rates.4 /
Through our interviews with lenders we priced out this straight
debt deal as follows: interest rate would be prime + 150 basis
points, swap fee - 100 basis points, loan origination fee = 50 basis
points. With our high risk economic scenario assumptions (prime rate
= 11%), the straight debt deal translates into a fixed liability of
12.5% (prime + 150 basis points), and the loan fee is calculated as
150 basis points (150 - 100 swap fee + 50 origination fee) of the
initial value figure of 410,120,145. This provides the Lender's Fee
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on the spreadsheet of $151,802. This fee is then capitalized and the
figure of $10,271,946 represents the total price with capital
improvements and capitalized loan points. The interest reserve
account of $385,122 is then added to this figure to get the total debt
figure of $10,657,069.
As we have already explained, we refinance the property at the end
of year 5. The refinancing explanation on the spreadsheet displays
this calculation. We have calculated a debt coverage ratio which is
used to justify our progress in the property's operations and leasing
activity to the lender. As one can see, it is not until year 3 that
we break the 1.0 margin. In year 5, the property satisfies the
lender's required debt coverage ratio of 1.15. With the LOC guarantee
and the structured interest reserve account, we are able to achieve
our financing objectives. Our discussion with a commercial lender
suggested that the release of the LOC guarantee might be contingent on
certain pre-defined growth marks (i.e., achieving the borrower's pro
forma). As our actual debt coverage exceeded their comfort criteria,
the LOC could be released.
Let's say I've.done a 10-year deal, and it was 100%
financing and there was a limited guarantee of repayment.
The guarantee of repayment falls away as the property
generates NOI on a predetermined formula basis. And
certain other events like completion would also have to
be met. /
As with the participating mortgage deal, in addition to providing the
LOC the lender would want the personal guarantee of the developer as
-91-
well as the right to approve major lease decisions and capital
expenditures.
DEVELOPER'S PERSPECTIVE
As can be seen in Exhibit 15 (previous), the straight debt deal
has the greatest risk for the developer and provides the greatest
reward. Although the developer did not contribute his own cash, he
may be responsible for the $2.66M LOC guarantee that has been provided
to the lender. The LOC guarantee is provided by outside investors and
allows the developer to preserve his capital. The developer's NPV
totals $1.57M. The IRR is not relevant for the developer and the LOC
investor as their capital contribution is zero.
There are several advantages to this financing alternative from
the developer's perspective. The greatest advantage is the fact that
the developer gives away the least amount of the upside potential of
the three financing alternatives. As can be seen in Exhibit 20
(previous), the developer and LOC investor split the cash flow
available for distribution 50/50. The developer is able to structure
the interest reserve account to fund the interest shortfall in the
first three years. In addition he locks in the interest rate by using
the interest rate swap.
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LOC INVESTORS
The LOC investor serves as a critical player in the structuring of
this deal. We have assumed that this deal would be done on a recourse
basis and that the lender would require 25% equity in the deal or a
substantial guarantee. In this deal, we have used the LOC from the
third party (LOC investor) as the substantial guarantee to satisfy the
lender's requirement. As stated in Warren, Gorham & Lamont's Real
Estate Investor's Deskbook, the developer can use third parties to
provide the guarantee.
In the case of income properties, the lender looks to the
cash flow from the property to service the loan and
therefore the primary security for the loan is the
property itself. Where the property is of lesser quality
or does not generate a cash flow, the borrower must
assume personal liability on the mortgage and, in
addition, may be required to provide other collateral in
the form of stocks and bonds or other assets, or
guarantees by third parties.6 /
By obtaining the LOC, the LOC investor becomes an integral player
in the deal. In return for his LOC guarantee, he receives 50% of
annual cash flow available for distribution, as well as 50% of the net
sales proceeds. This provides him with an NPV of $1.57M, which is
equivalent with the developer's NPV. Again the IRR is irrelevant for
the LOC investor because of his zero capital investment.
In the last chapter we will provide the reader with an analysis of
the three financing alternatives and conclude our discussion.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Interview with Mary Neuman, Vice President, Citicorp Real Estate,
Inc. (2/19/88).
2. Ibid.
3. Sadoff, Amy and Lisa Cashin, "Hedging tools provide developers
with flexibility in preparing for a worse-case economic scenario,"
National Real Estate Investor, March 1988, p. 80.
4. Neuman, op. cit.
5. Ibid.
6. Arnold, Alvin L., Real Estate Investor's Deskbook, Boston: Warren,
Gorham & Lamont, Inc., 1982, pp. 6-12.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION
In this concluding chapter we will discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of each financing alternative. We will focus on the
considerations that the developer would review in choosing the most
appropriate alternative. Finally, we will provide some concluding
remarks on our economic scenario and proposed deal.
FINANCING ALTERNATIVES
There is no "correct" answer to the choice of financing
alternative. As we stated earlier, the choice comes down to a
consideration of the risk the developer is willing or comfortable
taking, and then trying to optimize his return based on this level of
risk. We have attempted to keep all variables constant by accounting
for the developer's cost of equity in each alternative. In reviewing
the alternatives we have presented, we feel that the choice comes down
to the following question: "Which alternative maximizes developer's
NPV while allowing him to minimize his capital contribution and
capital at risk?" The answer to this question is attained by
focussing on the following three measurements for each alternative:
1) NPV of investment, 2) capital at risk, and 3) capital contribution.
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The straight debt deal provides the developer with the greatest
NPV and it allows the developer to maximize his participation in the
upside potential of the project. Exhibit 11 (previous) shows that the
developer maintains an effective 50% of the upside participation,
compared with 35% and 25% in the participating and joint venture
deals. The joint venture is the most attractive to the developer from
a capital at risk perspective. The straight debt deal requires the
LOC for $2.6 million which becomes the capital at risk for the LOC
investor. The participating mortgage deal required the developer to
raise equity totalling $1.5 million. This is the intermediate deal in
terms of capital at risk; however, the developer might have an easier
time raising the LOC than the equity (cash) for the participating
mortgage deal. The developer achieves 100% financing in both the
joint venture deal and straight debt deal and therefore these two
alternatives look better from a capital preservation perspective.
The bottom line is that the straight debt deal offers the greatest
reward but requires the greatest capital risk for the developer/LOC
investor. The participating mortgage deal is intermediate in terms of
capital at risk and reward. The joint venture offers the developer
the opportunity to participate in the deal without any capital risk.
Obviously the joint venture provides the lowest reward.
All three alternatives provide the developer with remedies against
the high interest rate environment. If the developer's objective is
simply to maximize return and he is comfortable with the capital at
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risk, the choice becomes the straight debt or participating mortgage.
Between these two deals the developer would have to ask if the extra
$1.1 million capital at risk with the LOC is worth the extra NPV of
4426,983 with the straight debt deal. If one assumes the developer
can live with the extra capital risk, than he should choose the
straight debt deal which will prove to be the most profitable!
An interview with a Washington, DC-based shopping center developer
typifies many developers' objectives of capital preservation and
profit maximization.
When deciding on financing alternatives we go out to the
market and quantify what our true cost of equity will
be. We then look at all the alternatives and figure out
how we can minimize our capital contribution and maximize
our return._1
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We feel that the high interest rate economic scenario we have
described, or some variation of it, has a strong probability of
occurring in the near future. We are reluctant to describe the extent
to which the budget deficit or trade deficit might contribute to its
cause or to what extent we might be faced with inflation or high
interest rates. We selected our economic assumptions in an attempt to
define a period that would not be a worst case.
Through interviews with numerous lenders and developers we have
concluded that value can be maximized through a combination of
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entrepeneurial asset management and creative financing. With
increased competition from pension funds and foreign investors, grade
A commercial properties are becoming too expensive and the best
opportunities lie with the entrepeneur who can identify, purchase, and
add value to mismanaged, under-utilized retail properties.
~
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FOOTNOTES
1. Interview with William J. Wolfe, President, First Washington
Development Group, March 11, 1988.
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